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High transport costs will dominate the course of lunar development. During the earliest phases, when
lunar facilities consist of a research and resource det_elopment coraplex u_th staff sertqng tours of a
few month_ tra_ costs will encourage local production of fueL food, and bulling materials. Once
these capabilities are in place and the number of personnel grows to a few hundred, staff rota_)n
might well dominate tra_ budgets. At that pcn'nt it would make economic sense to encourage some
members of staff to become permanent residents. By analogy u_th early British settlement in Austral_
a vigorous private sector economy could emerge if the lunar organization provided quasi_q_ort earnings
through its role as the community's major _ and as the major buyer of locally produced goods.
By providing such a market for goods and serv_ess the lunar organization u_uld not only prrn6de
a means whereby permanent residents could support themselves, but could also accelerate the process
of replacing imported goods with local manufactures, thereby reducing the cost of _r_rations. By
analogy with recent Alaskan _e, if the resource development activity started making rm.wy
from sales to orbital customers, export taxes and or royalty payments could also prot_le means by
uqJich a lunar community could _ ttself
INTRODUCTION
In the half century before Sputnik, many space enthusiasts
believed that space travel would eventually lead to settlement; that
permanent residents of extraterrestrial communities would
someday raise children and make livings from mining, manufac-
turing, tourism, farming, and a hundred other occupations, as had
countless terrestrial settlers before them (e.g., Clarke, 1950). The
settlement goal has remained in the background since Sputnik;
the space powers have concentrated on transportation technol-
ogies and space science. However, posterity may well remember
these efforts as preliminaries to settlement. In some sense, for the
last quarter century human and robot explorers have been doing
basic reconnaissance, and while there is a good deal of exploring
still left to do, the time for space pioneering may be only a few
decades in the future. Implementation of the goal of "expanding
the human presence beyond Earth into the solar system," adopted
recently by the Reagan Administration, couM lead, step-by-step,
from an Antarctic-style science base to permanent settlement.
Setting a goal is, of course, a different matter from actually
accomplishing the deed. In the last few years we have made great
progress in sketching the essential features of the science bases
and resource development facilities that will be important
precursors to permanent settlements (Mende//, 1985). With those
sketches in hand, we can now give thought to ways in which
economically viable extraterrestrial communities might plausibly
emerge in the context of an affordable space program.
Although pioneering settlements, particularly in novel environ-
ments, are often established for political, ideological, historical, or
social reasons, their long-term viability and growth almost always
depend on economic factors. Lk_g standards and the potential
for economic growth depend, in part, on the development of local
production capacity. However, any small community--pioneering
or otherwise--can produce only some of the needed goods and
services. The rest have to be bought from outside suppliers. Sup-
port of an import capacity comes from sales to customers outside
the community. Export opportunities available to early-stage lunar
or martian communities will be limited; the emergence (ff per-
manent communities will require dependence on public sector
employment and on public ,sector markets to a degree uncommon
in American frontier experience, in particular, and in terrestrial
frontier experience in general.
THE CLASSIC AMERICAN PATTERN
Because of our particular national experience, Americans are
generally used to thinking about the frontier in terms of small-
scale, private settlement ventures. The vast ma_rity of American
settlers were family farmers, farm workers, trappers, miners, or
town-based craftsmen and professionals, almost all of whom were
either self-employed or worked for others in small-scale
operations (Billington, 1963; Merck, 1978). In circumstances
where capital requirements and economies of scale favored or
mandated large enterprises like the cash-crop plantations of the
Old South, these too were private ventures. Although the states
and the federal government played vital roles in support of private
ventures--exploring new territot 3" and providing surveys, Army
protection, direct and indirect .subsidies (ff the construction and
operation of canals and railroads, etc.--most settlers suprx)rted
themselves in the private sector economy. Typical American
pioneers sought farmland not too far removed from river, road,
or railroad. Their goal was to produce, xs .soon as possible, f¢u)d
surpluses that could be sold to the Eastern cities and even to
Europe in exchange for the goods they could not prtxluce locally.
Although retained Calvanist/English attitudes toward central
authority and land ownership were important factors in deter-
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mining the dominant pattern of American settlement, above all
it was the abundance of good farmland and the accessibility of
large markets that shaped the American experience. Good land
and low-cost transport allowed individual farmers, even at mid-
continent, a considerable share in the fruits of the industrial age.
By and large, ,settlers provided their own import capacity through
their individual ability to directly produce exportable goods. Not
"all settlement ventures have had a comparable means of support.
ALASKAN SEI"IIEMENT
The history of Alaska illustrates an alternative pattern of
development. The territory's early nonaboriginal settlement
episodes resulted from the fur trade and from a ,series of gold
and copper discoveries. However, unlike California, Alaska had no
agricultural potential to take up the slack when the gold began
to run out (National Resources Committee, 1937). For a variety
of social, economic, and legal reasons, even salmon--a renewable
fixed-based resource that had been the basis of aboriginal
settlement--has played only a limited role in subsequent Alaskan
development. Taxes on salmon production provided the majority
of revenues available to the Territory of Alaska--72% in 1940
(Coo/ey, 1966)--but, since the industry employed a nonresident,
seasonal workforce, it provided little basis for permanent
settlement. Other than those towns that ()wed their origins
directly or indirectly to mining, almost all Alaskan settlement has
resulted from public expenditures of one form or another. The
city of Anchorage, for instance, started as a construction camp
for a government railroad built for the express purpose of
encouraging settlement. However, because of the lack of
agricultural potential and other factors, it was the railroad itself,
via salaries and other expenditures, that provided the economic
support for Anchorage and a handful of other towns along the
route (Wilson, 1977). Before 1940, Alaska's nonaboriginal
population never exceeded 30,000. Among Alaskan boosters, this
state of affairs was often attributed to Federal "neglect," but was
more a consequence of local economic realities.
However, beginning in 1940, population and import capacity
began to increase dramatically because of military construction
and other government activities that came with World War II and
the Cold War (Rogers, 1962). In essence, Alaska began to make
a living by providing government service, particularly service to
the national defense effort. Further expansion, beginning in the
1960s, resulted from oil discoveries, related construction
activities, and, particularly, from oil revenues that poured into the
Alaskan treasury. As part of statehotM legislation, Alaska acquired
ownership of potential oil lands at Prudhoe Bay and, after oil was
actually discovered, began to reap enormous revenues. Although
Ala_ska invests (mostly out of state) a significant fraction of its oil
earnings in a Permanent Fund--a ptx)l of money that might, at
.some future date, provide support for ,some public-sector activities
should earnings for nonrenewable resources dry up--most oil
revenues are spent on government salaries, public works, and even
a Permanent Fund dividend paid annually to every year-round
resident. Oil revenues ultimately pay for about 80% of Alaska's
imports, and fuel most of the local economy.
For a variety of re-asons, Alaska has yet to develop any "alternative
means of paying for imports and, indeed, there is very little local
manufacturing of any kind. Since 1940, a combination of relatively
inexpensive imports and a very high wage male have made it
impossible for locally produced goods to compete. Alaska's
internal economy depends almost entirely on the service sector.
Incentives toward local production of goods have been weak or
nonexistent.
The circumstances of lunar settlement will differ in obvious
ways from both the classic American and recent Alaskan
experiences. In particular, while a very high cost of transport will
severely restrict the range of economic options--for instance,
making it virtually impossible for individual settlers to make a
living as private exporters--those same high costs will put a
premium on local production capacity. This combination of
circumstances bears close resemblance to the early settlement of
Australia, an important historical case that suggests how growth
of a private sector economy might be stimulated in the lunar or
martian case.
THE AUSTRALIAN ANALOG
Before the advent of clipperships and steam, the only products
that could compete in global markets were those with very high
value per unit weight. Examples included precious metals and
gems, silk and certain other manufactured goods, spices, and drugs
like tea, rum, and tobacco. Grain and other ordinary foodstuffs
could bear the cost of transport across the North Atlantic, but
certainly couldn't be shipped profitably to Europe from as far away
as Australia (B/a/ney, 1966).
Cursory examination of the Australian coasts during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had revealed no obvious
products of value in international trade. Even after Captain Cook
noted the relative fertility of the southeast coast, there wasn't
much British interest in Australian settlement for the two simple
reasons that ( 1 ) private settlers could find easier outlets for their
energies in the United States and Canada, and (2) His Majesty's
government was preoccuppied with the American Revolution and
ongoing European conflicts. Australia would certainly have been
settled eventually, but probably not until well into the nineteenth
century had not other events intervened.
The roots of Australian settlement are to be found in the British
practice of sending convicts to the American colonies. Although
the number of convicts comprised only a tiny fraction of total
eighteenth century immigration into the Americas, a refusal by the
colonies to accept any more convicts "after 1774 created serious
problems for the British government. By the mid-1780s Britain's
local )aiLs and the countr_s few prisons were becoming very
overcrowded. The government was under considerable public
pressure to devise a solution but had a dilficult time finding one
it thought it could afford. Finally, in 1786, the Pitt government
decided to establish a penal settlement in Australia (Mackay,
1985). Although no one of that time would have described the
venture in the following way, we might say that His Maiesty's
government decided that an Australian settlement could earn its
keep by providing a public service, namely operating a prison. The
First Fleet arrived at Sydney Cove in January 1788. On board the
11 ships were about 1000 people: 750 of them convicts, and the
rest government employees and their families.
Planners in London had assumed that the convicts would grow
on government farms all the food that the colony would need.
As it turned out, the government farms were never very
productive. Fortunately, within a few years, some of the employees
and a few ex-convicts were producing surpluses on private farms.
The penal establishment, which typically was responsible for
feeding about half the population at any one time, began buying
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food in quantity and at prices less than those of imports (PTetcher,
1976a). These purchases by government, together with salaries
paid to its employees, provided hard cash with which the private
sector could satisfy its import needs.
Because of the great distance from Europe, imports were always
expensive, and there was plenty of incentive to produce goods
and services locally. For a quarter century, development of the
private sector was fueled both by growth of the population and
by the need to replace imports. Agriculture was the first priority,
but most people in the colony had neither the skills nor the
opportunity to make a living from farming. Indeed, farming
required at most about one third of the labor force, convict or
otherwise. Had everyone been a farmer, the colony would not
have prospered as it did, since there would have literally been
no markets for two thirds of the potential output. However, the
colony was blessed with a labor force that, although burdened
with a disproportionate number of unskilled people, otherwise
represented a fair cross section of the contemporary British talent
pool. There were craftsmen of almost every description, along
with clerks, tradesmen, and assorted professionals. Some were ex-
convicts, some were convicts given permission to support
themselves (thereby reducing the penal establishment's costs),
and these were eventually joined by people born in the colony
(Shaw, 1969). In one way or another most of these people helped
diversify and strengthen the local economy.
At any one time, the colonial population could be divided
roughly into three groups. One group consisted of the people
entirely supported--fed, clothed, and housed--by the penal
establishment. As mentioned previously, for many years this
included about half the population. Although the colony had no
viable export, government expenditures to feed these people and
otherwise support the penal establishment provided the private
sector with the essential hard cash with which it could pay for
imports. Government monies entered the colonial economy in the
form of salaries and of payment for goods bought by the Com-
missariat. The second segment of the population comprised those
people to whom these monies were paid. It was a relatively small
group, mostly civil and military officers who were joined later by
a number of ex-convicts who prospered in the colony. This group
played a central role in the economy through access to and
control of the colony's supply of hard cash (Butlin, 1985). The
omcers could have used the cash solely to support themselves
with imports, but that would have been an inefficient use of the
cash resource. Many of them had come to the colony intending
to get rich, so they bought less expensive, locally produced goods
and services from the remaining segment of the population, those
people without direct economic connection with the penal
establishment. These local purchases freed capital for investment
in enterprises that would yield additional hard cash through sales
of meat and grain to the penal establishment; many of the officers
did very well for themselves but, by spending money locally, they
helped stimulate and diversify the economy. Finally, as the
nonconvict population grew, those people without direct access
to hard cash nonetheless had considerable dealings with each
other. Through the process of import replacement, the economic
impact of government expenditures was greatly increased; by the
1820s the gross domestic product had increased to about four
or five times the level of government expenditures and, hence,
of the level of imports (Butlin, 1985). By early nineteenth century
standards the Australian settlement enjoyed a very high standard
of living.
By about 1820 the process of replacing imports had gone about
as far as it could, and that presented the colonial economy with
a problem. Government expenditures within the colony per
convict were leveling off while at the same time the proportion
of ex-convicts and native-born adults was increasing. In essence,
the import capacity--wholly supported at the time by government
expenditures--was being diluted. The economic importance of
the penal establishment was about to go into decline and with
it the standard of living--unless an export could be found. High
tr'atsl_rt costs limited the options, but sheep breeders gradually
discovered that they could make money from wool exports
(Abbott, 1969; Fletcher, 1976a).
The pastoral industry had arisen because of the potential for
large cash earnings from meat sales to the Commissariat. Although
the colony became more or less seE-sufficient in grain by the end
of the 1700s and produced large amounts of pork and chicken,
the numbers of cattle and sheep increased very slowly. For nearly
three decades the colony imported significant quantities of meat.
Indeed, the Commissariat bought no beef or mutton during the
colony's first 20 years because the early governors wanted to
ensure that the herds and flocks would grow as quickly as
possible. However, it was obvious that the Commissariat would
start buying meat in quantity once the animal populations had
grown large enough that demand could be satisfied out of na.qtral
increase. Once the government started buying meat, the level of
expenditures in the colony would increase significantly. In
anticipation of such sales, a number of the civil and military
officers concentrated their private efforts on the development of
pastoral operations. As with grain production, they were much
more successful in raising animals than was the government.
Commissariat meat purchases began in 1808 and sustained
expansion of the pastoral industry until the mid-1820s, by which
time local supply was satisfying demand.
The colony's first Merino sheep, a Spanish breed developed ff)r
wool production, had been introduced into Australia in the 1790s
but, because of the anticipated government demand for meat, little
effort had been devoted to breeding animals for fleece quality
rather than carcass weight. However, as meat supplies caught up
with demand, meat prices began to decline relative to wool. This,
together with other factors, led to a rapid expansion of the Merino
flocks in the 1820s and 1830s. By the end of the 1830s, New
South Wales was earning enough from wool exports to end its
dependance on the penal establishment; and in 1842 the colony
successfully lobbied London to stop sending convicts (kletche_,
197('_).
LUNAR SETrLEMENT
It is extremely unlikely that there will be a lunar penal estab-
lishment any time soon--the economics are all wrong, among
other things. However, a lunar research/resource development
organization could play much the same economic role that the
penal establishment did in New South Wales. The only significant
difference would be the fact that, unlike the Australian settlement,
in the beginning a lunar facility would have no permanent resi-
dents.
We will begin with a base camp. No matter whether we commit
to a lunar development program for scientific, geopolitical, or
other reasons, the very high cost of transport will put a premium
on the development of local production capabilities. Let us
assume, for the sake of discussion, that the emergent lunar-base
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program will be fiscally constrained to the annum delivery to low
Earth orbit (LEO) of 900 tons specifically for the support of lunar
operations. This is equivalent to six Saturn V launches. Current
scenarios (e.g., Babb et al., 1985) suggest these additional ground
rules: that staff of the lunar facility ,serve six-month tours; that the
facility consist of about one 20-ton module and I0 tons of CELSS
equipment per staff position; and that facilities to pr_xluce oxygen,
heat shields, and construction material mass about 100 tons each.
Within these constraints, the facility could achieve basic self-
sulticiencies in the production of food, construction materials, and
propellant by the end of the first decade. The facility at that point
might have a staff of 30 or so.
Past this point of development, the transport budget would be
dominated by deliveries of CELSS and other high-tech equipment,
and by staff rotation. The staff size could gradually increase--
constrained by CELSS installation--until staff rotation began to
consume virtually all the transport budget. If we assume a reusable
five-ton, four-passenger transfer vehicle, fueled with lunar oxygen
and terrestrial hydrogen, together with a six-month duty tour, the
cost of maintaining one staff position is about three tons delivered
annually to LEO. The maximum staff size is then about 300.
At some point, and probably at one well short of a 300-position
staff, the economics of crew rotation and train/rig should force
serious consideration of permanent residency. Much will depend,
of course, on the perceived economic, geopolitical, and/or
scientific/technical return generated by the lunar facility; but once
the facility begins to earn its keep, at least in intangible tern'ks,
then a commitment to permanent residency on the part of the
operating organization, its sponsors, and the potential residents
becomes plausible. At this point lunar settlement would begin.
During the stages leading up to settlement, living and working
conditions at a lunar facility will necessarily be spartan but must
be acceptable to staff. The Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) facility at
Prudhoe Bay offers some guidance. There, each member of the
500-person staff has a private bedroom of about 10 sq m and
shares a 7-sq m bathroom with one other person. There ,arc, in
addition, about 70Osqm of common areas--cafeteria, dining
rooms, lounges, atrium, gymnasium, movie theater, etc.--for a
total of about 18 sq m of nonwork space per person (ARC() staff,
private communication, 1987). Extensive conwnon areas are
particularly important.
Would-be permanent residents of a lunar facility would expect
and demand larger living quarters, including more common areas
and a higher standard of living than would be available in the
precursor stages. Expansion of the physical plant would probably
not be a major expense, provided that _weral tens of .square
meters per person could be built (in quantity, of course) at a
cost of a tiew tons of material shipped to LEO. On the other hand,
exlyanded services and access to goods could be quite expertsive
unless efforts were dew,ted toward local production. Of necessity,
the process of import replacement would continue and, by
analogy with the Australian case, could spur development of a
local private sector.
A way in which the process could begin is illustrated by the
history of Los Alamos, the research town founded during the
Second World War expressly to house Manhattan Project
personnel (e.g., Lyon and Evans, 1984). At first, people put up
with some rather primitive conditions, but it was wartime, and
few of them expected to stay once the conflict was over.
However, after the war, when the federal government decided
that the research effort would have to continue, the Atomic
Energy Commission began building permanent housing and
providing services that would make life attractive to the kinds of
people that the laboratory needed. The AEC was never very happy
about running what was, in essence, a civilian town and eventually
sold -all the housing and businesses to residents. It also began
turning public services over to the community, a process that
continues even now. The AEC, having been the town's landlord,
retained only the more limited role of operating the laboratory,
the town's dominant employer. The Los Alamos analogy is only
partly relevant because transport costs were never a major factor;
from the beginning, the town and laboratory were well integrated
into the state and national economies. Other than the laboratory
and the schools, the only economic activity in town has been at
the retail level. Import replacement was never a major consider-
ation. However, the los Alamos experience suggests that, at a
lunar facility, transfer of support services to residents could be
a first step toward the emergence of a private sector economy.
in the early stages, the lunar facility, like the ARCO operation
at Prudhoe, could be operated in a cashless mode. Salaries for
rotating employees might be substantial by terrestrial standards
but would have little relation to the actual cost to the organization
of maintaining an individual on the lunar surface. There being no
way to spend money at the lunar base, those salaries would be
banked on Earth. However, once support services are transferred
to residents--perhaps through lease/purchase arrangements--an
important second step would be conversion of the lunar facility
(at least with regard to permanent residents) to a cash-based
operation. This would require payment of salaries commensurate
with a lunar cost of living.
Transfer of support functions and conversion of the local
economy to a cash basis would not immediately produce savings
for the operating organization except in terms of reduced
expenditures for staff rotation and training. Permanent residents
will require a high standard of living and hence a higher level
cff imports than would rotating staff, at least until there is more
import substitution. However, transfer of support functions and
payment of salaries would provide would-be entrepreneurs with
sources of capital and, in the longer term, would accelerate the
import replacement process. That, in turn, would reduce the cost
to the lunar organization of conducting the retained research and
resource development functions.
By analogy with the Australian case, a lunar research/resource
development organization may be the only means of supporting
development of a local private sector economy. Both as an
employer and buyer, the organization can provide quasi-export
earnings with which permanent residents can pay for private
imtx)rts. The organization as a buyer--for instance of got_Ls and
services to support visiting research personnel (the lunar
equivalent of convicts)--would provide the major market that
would probably be necessary to stimulate import replacement on
a significant ,scale.
There is one other way in which a lunar community might
support itself. Although, in the long term, the private sector may
well produce a viable export, the lunar equivalent of wool, there
is also a very real prospect that, at a relatively early date, the
resource arm of the lunar organization (although perhaps not a
martian counterpart) would begin making profits from ."sales to
orbital customers. These export earnings would certainly generate
jobs but, as the Territory of Alaska discovered during its formative
years, severance (export) taxes are a far more reliable means of
forcing investment in community development.
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CONCLUSIONS
An appeal to historical analogs suggests that permanent
settlements on the Moon or Mars can emerge from a properly
structural, sustained program of re,arch and re,torte develop-
ment. The things needed in order to reach that goal fall into a
few broad categories. The_ include
1. A capability of launching into low-Earth-orbit--and then on
to the M(xm or Mars--significant amounts of cargo on a sustained
basis;
2. Engineering research that will alk)w pr(xluction of fixM, fuel,
and building materials from local re_mrccs at the earliest possible
date;
3. A research program that will make the best possible use of
the facilities and, thereby, provide a substantial ,_ientific and
engineering return on the investment in the years before there
are commercial profits;
4. An administrative and legal environment conducive to
settlement and the emergence of a local pri_me _ctor economy;
and
5. A commitment to the endeavor fi)r long enough to give it
a reasonable chance of success.
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